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Anselmian God Can Coexist with Reasonable Nonbelief
Abstract
Within the spectrum of doubt, divine hiddenness becomes a problem regarding the love of God. Why
would a loving God allow individuals whom he loves, if he loves everyone, to maintain ? According to
philosopher John Schellenberg, the existence of rational nonbelief poses a problem for divine hiddenness
which provides a reason to believe that God does not exist.
We argue that the problem of rational nonbelief does not pose a problem for divine hiddenness if one
adopts the doctrine of middle knowledge, a belief first proposed by Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina. We
first offers a defense for the doctrine of middle knowledge, including a brief biblical defense, before
arguing that a loving Anselmian God can coexist with a world where he permits reasonable nonbelief
given his knowledge of how much evidence is necessary to bring a person to faith, and those for whom
no amount of evidence would suffice.
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Introduction
Does the hiddenness of God preclude the notion of God’s existence? By
hiddenness, it is meant that since God is not visible and many of his intentions
behind certain events remain unknown, then God and his will are hidden from the
purview of humanity. Scripture acknowledges God’s hidden nature. In Psalm 88,
the psalmist cries, “LORD, why do you reject me? Why do you hide your face
from me?” (Psa. 88:14).1 The writer of Hebrews states that “faith is the reality of
what is hoped for, the proof of what is not seen” (Heb. 11:1). For those who have
experienced God in some sense, divine hiddenness may not pose a problem for
belief. However, for others, this may not prove to be the case.
Divine hiddenness can pose problems for faith, particularly when
individuals encounter tragic experiences leaving them to question God’s moral
nature, if God exists at all. More to the point, individuals struggle with an age-old
problem of why some people are not saved if God desires to save all people.2
Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser note that “Many people are perplexed,
even troubled, by the fact that God (if such there be) has not made His existence
sufficiently clear.”3 Furthermore, questions about those who do not believe can
cause further issues concerning God’s moral nature. If God loves everyone, then
why does reasonable unbelief exist?
John Schellenberg questions the existence of God from divine hiddenness
due to the problem of reasonable unbelief.4 If God loves all, then, according to
Schellenberg, God must provide necessary evidence of his existence to all people.
In his book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, Schellenberg offers the
1

Unless otherwise noted, all quoted Scripture comes from the Christian Standard Bible
(Nashville, TN: Holman, 2020).
2

Reformed notions of Christianity may not have the problem of indicating why God
would desire to save all people, as Calvinists argue that God chooses to save some, and chooses to
condemn others by predestination. However, Calvinism holds a much greater problem when
arguing for the concept of an Anselmian God, particularly God being the absolute Good, as it
were. Calvinist models are far more problematic for the divine hiddenness conundrum, as God is
held responsible for human evil. While Calvinists would argue against such an accusation, one
cannot escape the logical end of deterministic argumentation. Ultimately, God would be
responsible for human evil as much as he would be responsible for a person’s inability to respond
to divine grace.
3
Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, “Introduction: The Hiddenness of God,”
Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, eds (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.
4

“Reasonable unbelief” is used interchangeably with “reasonable nonbelief.”
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following argument:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

If there is a God, he is perfectly loving. And,
If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not
occur. But,
Reasonable nonbelief occurs. So,
No perfectly loving God exists. Therefore,
There is no God.5

These questions often fall within the category that Gary Habermas describes as
“emotional doubt”—that is, doubt that flows from “psychological causes, medical
causes, faulty [views] of God, childhood problems, old wounds, and judging by
feelings.”6 Two of Habermas’s assessments ring true in this issue: a faulty view of
God and judgment by feelings.7
The faulty view of God addressed by Schellenberg is not due to God’s
desire to see all people saved and the Anselmian view of God’s moral nature—
that is, as Anselm of Canterbury notes, “And, indeed, we believe that thou art a
being than which nothing greater can be conceived.”8 Both are affirmed. Rather,
the problem in Schellenberg’s argument is found in premise (ii). A good moral
God can exist in a world of reasonable nonbelief if God permits a form of
libertarian free will without withdrawing some notion of God’s omniscient nature.
The doctrine of middle knowledge as found in Molinism can offer a solution to
the problem of divine hiddenness—that is, the coexistence of an Anselmian God
with unbelievers’ reasonable nonbelief. To contend this notion, a biblical case
will be offered for the doctrine of middle knowledge and the solutions that middle
knowledge affords. Once middle knowledge is established as a viable option, then
a counterargument to Schellenberg’s second premise will be given. The argument

5

John Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1993), 83.
6

Gary Habermas, Dealing with Doubt (Chicago, IL: Moody, 1990),
http://www.garyhabermas.com/books/dealing_with_doubt/dealing_with_doubt.htm#ch2.
Os Guiness notes that “doubt is a matter of truth, trust, and trustworthiness. Can we
trust God?” Os Guinness, God in the Dark: The Assurance of Faith Beyond a Shadow of Doubt
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1996), 14.
7

8
Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogium 2, in Sidney Norton Deane with Saint Anselm,
Proslogium; Monologium; An Appendix, In Behalf of the Fool, by Gaunilon; and Cur Deus Homo,
Sidney Norton Deane, trans (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1939), 7. See also David Baggett and Jerry
L Walls, God & Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2016), 64.
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will show how a loving God can coexist in a world with reasonable unbelief. But
first, the Molinist position of middle knowledge needs some explanation.
The Core Tenets of Molinism
Luis de Molina was a Spanish Jesuit priest who lived from September 29,
1535 to October 12, 1600. He became a Jesuit priest when he was only eighteen
years of age.9 Molina was an expert in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica.
Thus, to understand Molina’s argumentation, one needs to first explore one of the
biggest struggles of Aquinas. Aquinas struggled to resolve the age-old problem of
how divine sovereignty interconnected with human freedom. Aquinas settled on a
resolution with which he was not completely comfortable, but one that seemed to
flow from the biblical material. Aquinas held that God predestined and gave his
effectual grace to those whom he foreknew would merit his grace.10 Aquinas said,
Since predestination includes will, as was said above,11 the reason
of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the
reason of the will of God … Now there is no distinction be
between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination;
as there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary
cause and from a first cause … Thus we might say that God
preordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He
preordained to give grace to merit glory.12
In this sense, Aquinas’s use of “preordained” refers to God’s foreknowledge of a
person’s merit, which includes the person’s responsiveness to God’s grace.13 But
the process brought questions to Molina’s mind. First, how does one resolve the
issue of human freedom within God’s action as a primary cause? Second, does
God desire to save everyone? Finally, are human beings responsible for what they
9
Timothy A. Stratton, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A
Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2020),
208.
10

Ibid., 212.

11

See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I.q19.a5, in Summa Theologica, Fathers of
the English Dominican Province, trans (London, UK: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1920), Logos
Bible Software.
12

Ibid., I.q23.a5.

13

Stratton, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, 212, fn 25.

Volume 5 Issue 2

December 2021

Page 62

do with God’s given grace?
Three Logical Moments: Natural, Middle, and Free
As previously noted, Aquinas accepted divine sovereignty, human
freedom, and a form of predestination. Aquinas held that God desired to reach
everyone but provided effectual grace to those whom God foreknew merited
grace. In some ways, Aquinas mirrored Jacob Arminius’s interpretation of
predestination.14 But Aquinas’s argument was not finished, for Aquinas continued
by noting that predestination was directed to a final end15 “from which it proceeds,
as from its first moving principle.”16 That is to say, God is the first mover and
offers grace to human beings, who in turn respond as secondary movers.
The question in Molina’s mind was how one could show that God’s
foreknowledge and foreordination worked together with human freedom to bring
about the final end. To this end, Molina designated three logical moments: natural
knowledge, middle knowledge, and free knowledge. Natural knowledge is the
first logical moment. Molina holds that natural knowledge is God’s knowledge of
all things that would be or not be, factual and counterfactual.17 God has a

“God decided to administer in a sufficient and efficacious manner the means necessary
for repentance and faith—this being accomplished according to divine wisdom, by which God
knows what is proper and becoming both to his mercy and his severity … This decree has its
foundation in divine foreknowledge, through which God has known from all eternity those
individuals who through the established means of his prevenient grace would come to faith and
believe, and through his subsequent sustaining grace would persevere in the faith. Likewise, in
divine foreknowledge, God knew those who would not believe and persevere.” Jacob Arminius,
Declaration of Sentiments, in Arminius and His Declaration of Sentiments: An Annotated
Translation with Introduction and Theological Commentary, W. Stephen Gunter, ed (Waco, TX:
Baylor University Press, 2012), 135.
14

15

Or teleological end.

16

Ibid.

Molina writes, “Through this type of knowledge, [God] knew all the things to which
the divine power extended either immediately or by the mediation of secondary causes, including
not only the natures of individuals and the necessary states of affairs composed of them but also
the contingent state of affairs—through this knowledge He knew, to be sure, not that the latter
were or were not going to obtain determinately, but rather that they were indifferently able to
obtain and able not to obtain, a feature that belongs to them necessarily and thus also falls under
God’s natural knowledge.” Luis de Molina, Concordia 52.2.9, in On Divine Foreknowledge: Part
IV of the Concordia, Alfred J. Freddoso, trans (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 168.
17
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knowledge of all possibilities and all conditions, including the laws of logic and
natural laws that God would create.18
Second, God also holds free knowledge. Free knowledge speaks to the
final end of things as Aquinas previously noted. In the case of human beings
responding to his grace, God knew fully and freely all people who would be
saved. Likewise, God knew, as Molina writes, “all contingent states of affairs
[that] were in fact going to happen.”19 In essence, free knowledge is comparable
to the Arminian understanding of foreknowledge. God foreknows all things that
will happen.20
Finally, coupled between natural knowledge and free knowledge, Molina
argues that one finds middle knowledge. Middle knowledge argues that God
knows what free creatures would choose given certain circumstances.21 Thus, God
knows which choices each person will or will not make from eternity past. While
middle and free knowledge are not essential to God’s necessary nature—or his
being an Anselmian God—they naturally flow from God’s necessary natural
knowledge of all things and his foreknowledge.22 William Lane Craig and Ken
Keathley use three words to explain natural, middle, and free knowledge: could—
God knows all possibilities that could happen; would—God knows which
possibilities would occur when free individuals are placed in certain
circumstances; and will—God extensively knows what will occur in the end.23
William Lane Craig explains that natural knowledge includes God’s knowledge of “all
possibilities. He knows all the possible individuals he could create, all the possible circumstances
he could place them in, all their possible actions and reactions, and all the possible worlds or
orders which he could create. God could not lack this knowledge and still be God; the content of
God’s natural knowledge is essential to him.” William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The
Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1999),
129.
18

19

Molina, Concordia 52.2.9, 168.

20

See also Craig, Only Wise God, 129.

Molina explains, “Middle knowledge, by which, in virtue of the most profound and
inscrutable comprehension of each faculty of free choice, He saw in His own essence what each
such faculty would do with its innate freedom were it to be placed in this or in that, or indeed, in
infinitely many orders of things—even though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do the
opposite, as is clear from what was said in Disputations 49 and 50.” Molina, Concordia 52.2.9,
168.
21

22
To claim that God does not know future contingent events, which both Aquinas and
Molina would differ, would be to hold that God is somehow limited by time.
23

Kenneth Keathley, Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach (Nashville, TN:
B&H Academic, 2010), 17; Craig, Only Wise God, 131.
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While Thomism is often counterposed to Molinism, it is questionable as to
whether Aquinas would have disagreed with Molina’s assessment of middle
knowledge. Aquinas himself provides an intriguing parallel to middle knowledge,
saying, “God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to
Him and the creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it
follows that God knows future contingent things.”24 If God knows all future
contingent things, then God would certainly possess the ability to know the free,
contingent decisions of free agents.
Divine Sovereignty and Middle Knowledge
Molinism strongly emphasizes God’s sovereignty. God oversees all things
and in is complete control. However, his sovereignty does not work in a scheme
that overrides human freedom. Rather, God works concurrently with and through
human freedom. Molina holds that God moves, applies, and even works alongside
the human faculty of choice.25 Using the example of Peter’s willingness to preach
Christ, Molina argues that God had to create an order that eventually led up to
Peter’s time, even working with the secondary causes; create Peter’s soul and
body; provide Peter with freedom of the will; the events leading up to Peter’s
speaking for Christ; the divine choice not to withhold Peter’s concurrence with
speaking within God’s will; and the ability of God to foreknow Peter’s
willingness to speak for Christ.26 Rather than detracting from God’s sovereignty,
Molinism actually fleshes out the exquisite nature of God’s knowledge and
sovereignty, as God’s primary actions lead to conditions that evoke secondary
free choices. While God may persuade and woo souls to himself, he does not
remove human responsiveness in the process. Millard Erickson, who accepts the
core tenets of Molinism,27 contends that this sovereign working comes by God’s
choice to confirm what he foresees free individuals doing as they respond and
react to God’s grace.28 Thus, the concurrent mode of sovereignty as found in

24

Aquinas, Summa Theologica I.q.14.a.13, Logos Bible Software.

25

Molina, Concordia 53.3.7, 243.

26

Ibid.

27
He compares this concept to sublapsarianism. Millard Erickson, Christian Theology,
3rd ed (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013), 333, fn 19.
28

Ibid.
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middle knowledge in no way disregards God’s sovereignty. In some ways, it
intensifies God’s sovereign nature.29
God’s sovereignty is also found in his complete knowledge of all people.
This does not mean that God only knows what people will freely choose to do, but
that God fully and completely knows each person before creating the universe.
Molina contends, “God does not get His knowledge from things, but knows all
things in Himself and from Himself; therefore the existence of things, whether in
time or eternity, contributes nothing to God’s knowing with certainty what is
going to be or not going to be.”30 Molina holds that God’s knowledge works in
harmony with his omnipotence, as in “God there is providence and predestination
with regard to future contingents.”31 That is, God has the ability to bring about the
intended results he desires while using free agents.
One finds Scriptural support for this concept in Jeremiah chapter 1. God
said to Jeremiah, “I chose you before I formed you in the womb; I set you apart
before you were born. I appointed you a prophet to the nations” (Jer. 1:5).
Interestingly, God appointed Jeremiah as a prophet, placing him in the appointed
time and place, while knowing that Jeremiah would respond to God’s call to the
prophetic ministry. Thus, God places individuals in certain times, certain places,
and within certain circumstances to bring about certain ends without removing a
person’s ability to respond to God’s calling. Jeremiah could have rejected God’s
proposal, as he initially began to do. However, God knew Jeremiah’s final
response.
Divine Loving Desire and Middle Knowledge
Even though Molinism shares the concept of God’s sovereignty along with
Calvinists, the Molinist system excels at affirming God’s desire to save all people
which is problematic for the Calvinist approach.32 Molina argues for concomitant
degrees in God’s decrees. Molina holds that even though God possesses complete
and precise knowledge of all future contingent events, his antecedent desires do
not always necessarily match his permissions. Due to the problematic nature of
human free choice—that is, that humans often choose wrongly—God permits evil
God’s sovereignty is much stronger in this sense, because he is able to work with and
through free agents as compared to determinist models, where God orders, dictates, and executes
his plans without the ability to use free creatures.
29

30

Molina, Concordia 49.12, 120.

31

Ibid., 49.13, 121.

32

Keathley, Salvation and Sovereignty, 152.
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events in time, but he does not directly bring them about.33 If one is to accept
genuine human freedom, then one must concur with Erickson that genuine
freedom, if not even permitting the nature of genuine humanity itself, must be
granted the ability to do things contrary to God’s desired will.34 Thus, while God
may seem hidden in times of evil, God can still work things for an ultimate good.
Taking the distinction between God’s desired will and permitted will
through the lens of middle knowledge, one can see how it is possible for a loving
God to desire to see individuals saved but permits individuals the capacity to
choose otherwise. God’s desire to see all souls saved is something that is evident
in Scripture. Peter acknowledges that “The Lord does not delay his promise, as
some understand delay, but is patient with you, not wanting any to perish but all
to come to repentance” (2 Pet. 3:9). Additionally, the prophet Ezekiel writes, “Do
I take pleasure in the death of the wicked?’ This is the declaration of the Lord
GOD. ‘Instead, don’t I take pleasure when he turns from his ways and lives?’ …
‘For I take no pleasure in anyone’s death.’ This is the declaration of the Lord
GOD. ‘So repent and live!’” (Eze. 18:23, 32).35 Paul also writes, “This is good, and
it pleases God our Savior, who wants everyone to be saved and to come to the
knowledge of the truth. For there is one God and one mediator between God and
mankind, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all, a testimony
at the proper time” (1 Tim. 2:3-6). As shown in both the Old Testament and New
Testament, God is a benevolent Being who desires that all come to repentance—
stemming from his antecedent desired will—but, because of his granting of
human freedom, God allows individuals to freely rebel due to his contingent
permission.
Biblical Defense for Middle Knowledge
The Molinist conception of middle knowledge hangs on two distinct
concepts: the sovereign omniscience of God and human libertarian free will. If the
Christian theist is to even use the Molinist conception of middle knowledge to
combat atheistic conclusions regarding divine hiddenness, middle knowledge
must find warrant withing the biblical data. Thus, divine sovereign as evidenced
through God’s omniscience and human libertarian free will must be evidenced in
Scripture if middle knowledge is to be a viable option. In this section, biblical
Alfred Freddoso explains that for Molina, “evil effects are antecedently permitted in
that by His middle knowledge God allows for them in detail and knows that they will ensue given
that same causal contribution.” Alfred J. Freddoso, “Introduction,” in Molina, Concordia, 43.
33

34

Erickson, Christian Theology, 395.

35

See also Ezekiel 33:11.
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data demonstrating middle knowledge in God’s sovereign omniscience will show
that God not only has knowledge of all future contingencies, but that God is also
aware of counterfactuals. Additionally, biblical data will be shown to accept the
concept of soft libertarian free will, otherwise known as concurrence.
Middle Knowledge and the Sovereign Omniscience of God
Sovereign omniscience is meant to acknowledge God’s knowledge of all
things, past, present, and future. This would include factuals and counterfactuals.
If God could not know counterfactuals, then God could not be an Anselmian God
(i.e., a maximally great Being). The Scripture provides ample evidence that God
knows future contingent events. First, Scripture holds that God knows future free
actions before they occur. David proclaims that “Before is word is on my tongue,
you know all about it, LORD” (Psa. 139:4). Paul, alluding to Amos 9:11-12,
writes, “After all these things I will return and rebuild David’s fallen tent. I will
rebuild its ruins and set it up again, so that the rest of humanity may seek the
Lord—even all the Gentiles who are called by my name—declares the Lord who
makes all things known from long ago” (Acts 15:16-18). Isaiah also
acknowledges God’s complete knowledge by saying, “Speak up and present your
case—yes, let them consult each other. Who predicted this long ago? Who
announced it from ancient times? Was it not I, the LORD?” (Isa. 45:21a). Thus,
God knows future events in totality.
Second, Scripture notes how God’s foreknowledge works in cooperation
with election. Paul writes, “For those he foreknew he also predestined to be
conformed to the image of his Son, so that he would be the firstborn among many
brothers and sisters. And who he predestined, he also called; and those he called;
he also justified; and those he justified, he also glorified” (Rom. 8:29-30).36 Peter
also acknowledges how God’s sovereign knowledge works within human
freedom. Appealing to his countrymen, Peter preaches that the people killed the
Source of life (Acts 3:15)—referencing Jesus—and God raised him from the
death. He then contends that “And now, brothers and sisters, I know that you
acted in ignorance, just as your leaders did. In this way God fulfilled what he had
predicted through the prophets—that his Messiah would suffer” (Acts 3:17-18).
Thus, Peter views the personal choices of the people of his day working within
36

This passage is highly controversial. Calvinists, such as Wayne Grudem, hold that
foreknowledge does not look at anything of merit in the person. However, the Calvinist argument
still holds that God foreknows each individual and chooses whom he will save. Thus, it appears
that God has some reasoning to save some. If God has complete sovereign omniscience, then one
could not eliminate the possibility that God would have been able to foresee each person in totality
and what each person would freely choose to do. Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An
Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 2020), 825.
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God’s sovereign knowledge. But God permitted things to go as they did to bring
about his intended will.
While God’s foreknowledge is accepted by the vast majority of Christians,
God’s counterfactual knowledge requires a bit more investigation. For God to
hold middle knowledge, he would need to not only see what would happen in
time (factuals), but also what could happen had someone chosen differently
(counterfactuals). Molina offers two passages of Scripture to defend this
position.37 First, Jesus noted that “if the miracles that were done in you had been
done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented in sackcloth and ashes long
ago” (Matt. 11:21). Jesus states that if he had performed miracles in Tyre and
Sidon to the level and degree that the people had received in Israel, then the
people of Tyre and Sidon would have repented.38
Additionally, David’s consultation with the Lord in 1 Kings 23:10-12
affords another exhibition of God’s counterfactual knowledge. David asked God
if Saul would descend on Keilah if David went there. God told David that Saul
would descend, and that the men of Keilah would hand him over to Saul. David
did not go to Keilah, thus the two events that God predicted could occur did not
happen.39 Thus, God’s factual and counterfactual knowledge is in full view. One
could also argue that God’s prophetic words to nations about what would happen
if they did not repent and what could happen if they did. Molinists, like Craig,
have acknowledged the tremendous fruitfulness of middle knowledge. Craig
writes that middle knowledge is “one of the most fruitful theological ideas ever
conceived. For it would serve to explain not only God’s knowledge of the future,
but divine providence and predestination as well.”40 As shown, middle knowledge
finds a home in the biblical narrative.
Middle Knowledge and Human Libertarian Free Will
37

Molina, Concordia 49.9, 116-117.

38
A question emerges as to whether Jesus is speaking metaphorically or literally. In
either case, his counterfactual knowledge emerges. For the hyperbolic view of Matthew 11, see
William Lane Craig, “The Middle Knowledge View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views,
James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy, eds (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2001), 121-122. For the literal
view, see Zachary Breitenbach, Slipping Through the Cracks: Are Some Lost Who Would Have
Been Saved in Different Circumstances? (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2021), 66. But one must
ask, would repentance have led to salvation, or could it have been a temporary turning from their
current actions? Most assuredly, this requires further investigation.
39
Other biblical examples of middle knowledge can be found in Breitenbach, Slipping
Through the Cracks, 65-79.
40

Craig, Only Wise God, 127.
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Human freedom finds an abundant home in the pages of Scripture. The
covenants of Scripture along with the law itself seem to imply that human beings
have the ability to choose x versus y. Aquinas argues that humans must have free
will according to Scripture; otherwise, “counsels, exhortations, commands,
prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain.”41 In the New
Testament, people are called to repent and believe in Jesus (Matt. 3:2, 4:17; John
3:16; Acts 3:19; Rom. 10:9; and 1 John 3:23). A refusal to turn to Christ also
illuminates a person’s ability to reject God’s grace given to them (John 5:40).
Furthermore, Paul holds that those who reject Christ are without excuse (Rom.
1:20-21), which particularly fits the aspect of divine hiddenness. That is, God
grants people the opportunity to believe, but many refuse of their own volition.
While Scripture seems to acknowledge human freedom, it does not go so
far as to claim that a person can do anything as they please. For instance, a person
cannot choose the nation or the family into which one is born (Rom. 9).
Furthermore, a person cannot choose one’s height or add days to one’s life (Matt.
6:27). This kind of freedom matches what Keathley calls soft libertarianism, or
concurrence.42 Thus, soft libertarianism does not dictate that a person can choose
anything, but rather that a person can choose those things that are within their
volitional power to choose.
A Middle Knowledge Resolution to Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness
Problem
Thus far, the paper has shown the basic tenets of Molinism, explained
middle knowledge, and provided a biblical defense for sovereign omniscience and
human free will. One may question what the aforementioned data has to do with
divine hiddenness. It is in this section that the connection will be made. Middle
knowledge can answer Schellenberg’s objection to God’s existence from his
hidden nature. As previously noted, premise (ii) of Schellenberg’s argument is
questionable, where he claims that “If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable
nonbelief does not occur.”43 If middle knowledge is true, as has been shown, then
41

Aquinas, Summa Theologica I.q83.a1.

“Soft libertarianism, or concurrence, is very similar to soft determinism in many ways
but views human responsibility differently in several crucial aspects.” Keathley, Salvation and
Sovereignty, 71-72. The five tenets of soft libertarianism include ultimate responsibility, agent
causation, the principle of alternate possibilities, the reality of will-setting moments, and the
distinction between freedom of responsibility and freedom of integrity. Ibid., 73.
42

43

John Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1993), 83.
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it is perfectly acceptable to hold that a loving God can coexist within a world
where reasonable nonbelief occurs, because God knows all individuals fully and
completely, and God knows all future contingents. By his middle knowledge, God
realizes how much evidence is required to bring a person to faith, and he also
knows that, for some, no amount of evidence would suffice. If middle knowledge
is true, as this paper has suggested, then the following argument could be given in
response to Schellenberg’s second premise.
(i)

(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

If an Anselmian God exists,44 then he would provide sufficient
evidence of his existence to those whom he foreknew would
respond to his grace.
If middle knowledge is true, then God foreknew all who would
respond to his grace.
Middle knowledge is true.
Therefore, an Anselmian God provides sufficient evidence of his
existence to those whom he foreknows will respond to his grace.
Therefore, an Anselmian God exists.

The paper has spent a lot of time defending the concept of middle knowledge—
the linchpin of this argument. However, a few other factors need to be considered,
particularly how they help to answer the divine hiddenness problem. God’s
complete relational knowledge of future beings and how that impacts sufficient
evidence and his permissive directly relate to the divine hiddenness issue.
Divine Hiddenness, Middle Knowledge, and Sufficient Evidence
Molina argues that God completely knows each person that he will create,
as evidenced in Jeremiah 1 and other passages.45 God completely knows each
person’s decision. Wayne Grudem, a Calvinist theologian, pushes back on this
concept, arguing that foreknowledge impedes human freedom. Grudem writes,
For if God can look into the future and see that person A will come to faith
in Christ and that person B will not come to faith in Christ, then those facts
are already fixed, they are already determined long before these persons
were even born. If we assume that God’s knowledge of the future is true

44
Anselmian God, here, refers to a perfectly, loving God for whose existence is
necessary, otherwise known as a maximally great Being.
45

Molina, Concordia 49.11, 119.
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(which it must be), then it is absolutely certain that person A will believe
and person B will not. There is no way that their lives could turn out any
differently than this.46
However, this is not necessarily true as knowledge does not strip one’s ability to
choose x versus y. It stems from a complete understanding of the person in
question. For instance, a mother may know her son to the point that she can
accurately predict what her son would do given certain circumstances. If the son
loves to play his video games in the basement, she can accurately predict that her
son is in the basement playing his video game when she returns home from work.
If a parent holds a limited form of middle knowledge from a complete knowledge
of her child, then consider the level and degree of middle knowledge that God
must hold given God’s ability to operate beyond the scope of time’s restraints.
God is on another level of knowledge that is higher than what anyone could begin
to fathom.
But what about reasonable nonbelief? Schellenberg defines reasonable
nonbelief as “exemplified by any instance of failure to believe in the existence of
God that is not the result of culpable actions or omissions on the part of the
subject.”47 This kind of nonbelief comes, according to Schellenberg, from no fault
on the part of the skeptic.48 But is this necessarily the case? How much evidence is
sufficient? Jeffrey Jordan rightly points to a problem within Schellenberg’s
argument. According to Jordon’s assessment, Schellenberg argues that “God’s
love must be directed toward every human as its object; and must be as deep as
possible with every human an equal recipient.”49 But could it not rightly be said
that some people will refuse to believe no matter how much evidence is given?
Atheist Lawrence Krauss noted how science “does not make it impossible to
believe in God, but rather makes it possible to not believe in God.”50 It could be
argued that some atheists simply do not desire God to exist, and science affords
them that option. Yet numerous other scientists and mathematicians—such as
46
Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine, 2nd ed
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 2020), 827.
47

Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 59.
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Jeffrey Jordan, “Divine Hiddenness and Perfect Love,” European Journal for
Philosophy of Religion 9.1 (2017): 191.
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Stephen Meyer, Isaac Newton, and John Lennox—strongly believe in God’s
existence. The realm of Christian apologetics elucidates numerous reasons for
believing in God’s existence, to the point that even former atheists such as Lee
Strobel and J. Warner Wallace have come to accept the Christian faith even after
ardently opposing it. Thus, can it really be said that God is hidden after all? Could
it not be said that God has provided everything necessary for belief?
Reasonable nonbelief is to be expected in a world of free agents. In fact,
Jesus acknowledged this level of unbelief. In his Parable of the Rich Man and
Lazarus, the rich man cries out asking that his family would be persuaded not to
come to the hellish place that he abides. In Jesus’s parable, Abraham said to the
rich man, “They have Moses and the Prophets: let them listen to them” (Luke
16:29, NIV).51 The rich man then expresses that if a person were to rise from the
dead, then maybe they would listen to that person. But Abraham rightly answers,
“If they do not listen to Moses and the Prophets, they will not be convinced even
if someone rises from the dead” (Luke 16:31, NIV). According to middle
knowledge, God knows what a person would do when given certain
circumstances. As such, God knows how much evidence is sufficient for each
person, and he also knows that some will not respond regardless of how much
evidence is provided.52 Again, this flows from the complete knowledge God has
of each individual.
Schellenberg seems to argue that truth always wins the day. However,
truth may not always be enough to win people over to a certain perspective. For
instance, consider Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. In his story, a man is released
from the confines of the cave that housed him since his youth. He experienced the
grandeur of the world as it actually exists. Yet when he returned to tell his
comrades, he was met with laughter and was eventually killed due to the inability
of the men to consider the nature of his claims. Plato writes,
Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual
prisoners in ‘evaluating’ these shadows while his vision was still
dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this
time required for habituation would not be very short—would he
not provoke laughter, and would it not be said of him that he had
51

Scripture noted as NIV comes from the New International Version (Grand Rapids, MI:
Biblica, 2011).
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returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was
not worthwhile even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible
to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and
lead them up, would they not kill him1533?” “They certainly
would,” he said.53
Schellenberg’s expresses a bit of naivety as he thinks that any and all reasonable
persons would accept evidential claims of God’s existence. But, as noted by
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave and Jesus’s Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus,
some people would not be convinced even if God were to fully reveal himself—
even raising someone from the dead. Some may account their experience with
God as the result of indigestion from last night’s burrito or a mental hallucination
stemming from the stressors of life. Sufficient evidence is a relative concept.
What may be considered sufficient evidence for some, may be insufficient for
others. Much of what is considered sufficient evidence depends on one’s biases,
resistance, and rationality to accept truth claims. Furthermore, as Alvin Plantinga
has shown, belief in God could be considered a warranted belief, which may not
require any evidence for some.54
Divine Hiddenness, Middle Knowledge, and Permissive Will
As previously noted, middle knowledge draws the distinction between
God’s permissive will and desired will. Schellenberg argues that if God loved
everyone, then he would provide sufficient evidence for all people. It was already
noted that sufficient evidence is relative to each individual. For some, no amount
of evidence for God’s existence would be sufficient. Schellenberg argues that God
must “maximally extended and equally intense.”55 However, God may love each
person intensely, but allow the possibility that some people would reject his
loving advances. By its very nature, love is trifold, requiring a lover as a first
mover, the beloved as a recipient of love, and the free spirit of love found
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between the two parties.56 If God were to force his love on a person, one could not
claim that the relationship that ensued was a true loving relationship. The love
that people have for one another is modeled on the loving relationship that God
enacts with his creation. As such, God extends grace to each person, called
common or universal grace.57 However, salvific grace requires the responsiveness
of the beloved. William Lane Craig rightly notes that a person seeking God does
not only need to search God with the mind, but there must also be a sincere
“search of the soul.”58
Middle knowledge allows for God to hold a love for every person while
also permitting people to reject his grace. What Schellenberg fails to realize is that
forced love on God’s part would not be love at all. In the scope of middle
knowledge, God knows how to engage each person. As God engages people
through his middle knowledge, his love moves the course of history to the point
where his hiddenness will be fully revealed (Phil. 2:6-11).59 Genuine expressions
of love would precipitate the existence of reasonable nonbelief of some.
Before concluding, a further word should be said about the evidence given
to the world through the incarnation of Christ. Karl Barth noted that God became
accessible to all people, even visible to humanity, because “Jesus Christ can
reveal God because He is visible to us as men.”60 Thus, God has provided the
world with more than sufficient evidence of his existence through the death,
burial, and resurrection of Jesus. As Paul asserts, “The Son is the image of the
invisible God” (Col. 1:15, NIV). The incarnation of Christ was, in essence, the
fullest manifestation of divine hiddenness come to light. In Jesus and through the
Spirit of God, God is not so hidden after all.
56
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Conclusion
As this article has shown, Schellenberg’s divine hiddenness argument does
not hold as much weight when adopting the doctrine of middle knowledge. A
perfectly loving God—or an Anselmian God, that Being from which nothing
greater could be conceived—can logically coexist in a world where some
individuals hold reasonable nonbelief in God’s existence. The problem, as it has
been shown, is not so much a matter of God’s lack of revealing his identity, as
Christ is the ultimate revelation of God’s existence, as much as it is the rejection
of individuals from searching out God both intellectually and with the soul.
Doubt is often a complicated process as it involves intellectual, volitional,
and emotional reasons within the mind and heart of the doubter. But to claim that
God’s existence is impossible due to the existence of rational nonbelief is quite
unfair as it does not consider that some may not respond even to the most rational
of God’s advances. Middle knowledge affords an excellent way to explain how an
Anselmian God can desire for all people to be saved, offer sufficient evidence for
those whom God knows will respond to his grace, and to permit human response,
both pro and con, due to his granting of human libertarian free will. It is expected
that, given middle knowledge, that God would permit individuals to respond in
various manners as the nature of love itself requires the free expressions of
compassion from the lover and the beloved without either party being forced.
Middle knowledge offers additional support to other aspects of divine
sovereignty. Further explorations would prove fruitful if one were to research how
middle knowledge may explain the hiddenness of God in times of tragedy. Such
research would prove especially helpful with problems of theodicy and possibly
provide potential reasons behind why God permits evil to occur.
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